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The Three Pillars of the 
Responsibility to Protect
Alex J. Bellamy
Agreed by Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World 
Summit, the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle has come a 
long way in a short space of time. The principle was employed by the 
United Nations Security Council in response to crises in Darfur, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, 
Syria and, most controversially in Libya. It has also been employed 
by the United Nations Secretary-General, other senior UN officials 
and several member states in relation to these crises and those in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Guinea.  Through RtoP, international society has come to 
view emerging crises through the prisms of atrocity prevention and 
response – focusing increasingly on what the world can do to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. Inevitably, however, as the principle has come into 
widespread diplomatic use it has aroused controversy and debate, 
not least in relation to the use of military force (as in the case of 
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 Libya) and the use of the veto to block decisive action through the 
UN Security Council (as in the case of Syria). Focusing on the three 
pillars of RtoP, this chapter attempts to provide context for the other 
contributions to this volume by outlining the emergence of RtoP, 
clarifying the meaning and scope of its three pillars, and examining 
debates about the relationship between them. 
Emergence 
Although the phrase ‘responsibility to protect’ was first coined only in 
2001, the concept is the product of long-standing efforts to identify 
and define crimes that have ‘shocked the conscience of mankind’ and 
to protect populations from them. As the UN Secretary-General has 
argued, RtoP is a political concept based on existing international 
law. The story of the principle’s emergence therefore begins with 
international law. 
In 1947, in the shadow of the Holocaust, the newly formed UN General 
Assembly approved the Genocide Convention, which prohibited the 
crime of genocide, created a universal responsibility to prevent that 
crime, and required the punishment of perpetrators.1 In Bosnia vs. 
Serbia (2007), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that 
states have a legal responsibility to do what they can, within existing 
law, to prevent genocide. Specifically, the court found that states had 
a responsibility to take positive action to prevent genocide when they 
have prior knowledge about its likely commission and the capacity 
to influence the suspected would-be perpetrators. The four Geneva 
Conventions (1949) and subsequent Protocols (1977) established 
the immunity of all non-combatants in armed conflicts, whether in 
international or non-international, from the intentional use of force 
against them and required that Parties cooperate with one another to 
prevent violations of the law. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) (1998) extended some of these provisions to 
contexts outside of armed conflict under the rubric of ‘crimes against 
humanity’, whilst the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) confirmed that the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ constituted 
one such crime. When states committed to the RtoP concept in 2005, 
therefore, they were effectively acknowledging the legal obligations 
Alex J. Bellamy
37
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
that they already had and committing themselves to ensuring that 
this existing law be upheld everywhere, all the time. 
During the 1990s, however, the gap between these international 
legal responsibilities and realities on the ground became glaringly 
obvious. Genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica; mass killing and 
ethnic cleansing in Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Croatia, East Timor, 
Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire/DRC; state repression in 
northern and southern Iraq; and acute state fragility and civil war 
leading to mass human suffering in Somalia exposed the hollowness 
of legal responsibilities in the face of governments and armed 
groups willing and able to use mass civilian suffering to achieve 
their objectives. International society was initially ill-prepared to 
respond. UN peacekeepers recoiled in the face of the genocidaires in 
Rwanda and stood aside as Security Council mandated ‘safe areas’ 
collapsed in Bosnia. US forces were hounded out of Mogadishu, 
taking UN peacekeepers with them. Political and diplomatic efforts 
proved insufficient to stop Angola’s slide back into war and the mass 
violence that greeted East Timor’s vote for independence. These, 
and other, crises exposed the weaknesses of international society’s 
capacity and willingness to protect populations. They also created a 
global crisis of internal displacement, as up to twenty million people 
were forced from the homes but left unable to claim the protections 
afforded by International Refugee Law because they had not crossed 
an international border. 
Gradually, international agencies began to learn the lessons of 
these failures and to develop new concepts such as the ‘protection 
of civilians’ and ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. First, Francis Deng 
and Roberta Cohen developed initial ideas about ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’ in the context of the crisis of displacement in the mid-
1990s. Deng was appointed as the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 1993. Deng 
and Cohen developed the concept of sovereignty as responsibility as 
a diplomatic and moral tool to persuade states to allow IDPs access 
to humanitarian assistance and protect their human rights (Cohen 
and Deng 1998). This concept rested on the idea that sovereignty 
entailed responsibilities as well as rights and that chief among 
those responsibilities was the state’s duty to protect populations in 
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its care. When states are unable to exercise this duty, they should 
request international assistance. If they do not, then they should be 
held accountable (Deng and al. 1996:1). From this, RtoP derived its 
focus on ‘responsibility’, the notion that the primary responsibility to 
protect rests with the sovereign states, and the idea that the purpose 
of external action should be to assist states to fulfill their obligations 
and, failing that, to provide protection to vulnerable populations.   
Second, there a range of regional initiatives sought to respond to 
the humanitarian challenge: A number of regional organizations 
established their own initiatives that contributed to the emergence 
of RtoP. Most notably, Article 4(H) of the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union (AU), adopted in 2000, gave the organization a right 
to intervene in the affairs of its Member States in matters relating 
to genocide and crimes against humanity. The AU also developed 
its own peacekeeping capacities and adopted a protection mandate 
in Darfur (2003). The EU established and deployed high readiness 
brigades in response to protection crises and in the mid-1990s the 
OSCE established its High Commissioner for National Minorities 
to assist states under stress. NATO also incorporated the protection 
of civilians into its crisis management work (MacFarlane and Foong 
2006:174).
Third, many humanitarian agencies identified protection as a core 
goal. Often caught on the frontline of emergencies caused by armed 
conflict, natural disasters and poverty, humanitarian relief agencies 
increasingly recognized the limits of traditional approaches that 
distributed aid on the basis of need and neutrality without regard 
for the underlying politics. Sometimes, this approach created the 
phenomenon of the ‘well fed dead’ - civilians given food, housing and 
medical relief by humanitarians only to be killed or displaced again 
by armed conflicts. Sometimes, humanitarians inadvertently made 
matters worse by aiding genocidaires and unwittingly providing bases 
for armed groups, as happened in eastern DRC after the Rwandan 
genocide (Terry 2002). In response, many humanitarian organizations, 
including Oxfam and CARE, adopted ‘protection’ as one of their 
core goals, promoting the idea that the protection of people from 
egregious crimes ought to be core business for humanitarians.2
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Fourth, the theory and practice of peacekeeping evolved so that 
protection moved from the periphery to the centre. High profile 
peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Bosnia prompted fresh thinking 
about the protection roles and responsibilities of UN peacekeepers. In 
2000, the UN’s Panel on Peace Operations (so-called ‘Brahimi report’) 
argued that peacekeepers that witnessed violence against civilians 
should be ‘presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means’. 
Starting in 1999, with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 
the Security Council has with increasing regularity employed Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter to authorize peacekeepers to use ‘all necessary 
means’ to protect civilians. Today, most UN peacekeeping operations 
have a protection mandate (Holt and Berkman, 2006).
Fifth, the UN Security Council adopted a thematic agenda on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict. In 1998, at the request of 
Canada, which was then a non-permanent member, the Security 
Council requested a report from the Secretary-General on how the 
UN might improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The 
following year, it adopted Resolution 1265 expressing its ‘willingness’ 
to consider ‘appropriate measures’ in response to ‘situations of armed 
conflict where civilians are being targeted or where humanitarian 
assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed’. Periodic 
reports of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict have become a recurrent feature of the Council’s 
work and through this it has, among other things, pledged to work 
towards an end to impunity, requested that Member States ratify key 
human rights treaties, adopted an aide memoire on protection, and 
demanded humanitarian access in crisis situations. 
These, and other, initiatives allowed the then UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, to declare in 1999 that ‘state sovereignty, in its most 
basic sense, is being redefined…States are now widely understood 
to be the servants of their people, not vice versa’.3  This emerging 
conception of sovereignty as entailing responsibilities clashed, 
however, with more traditional ways of understanding it. Since 1945 
at least, sovereignty had been commonly understood as entailing a 
right to non-interference, a right reflected in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter. This raised the difficult question of how the international 
community should respond to situations in which the state failed 
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to protect its own population from conscience-shocking crimes or 
when the state itself was among the principal perpetrators of such 
crimes. These questions were brought into sharp focus by the crisis 
in Kosovo in 1998-1999. When international negotiations, sanctions 
and observers failed to stem the tide of violence, which included 
the systematic ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Yugoslav 
government forces, NATO decided to intervene militarily despite not 
having a UN Security Council mandate to do so.  The intervention 
triggered a major debate on the circumstances in which the use 
of force for human protection purposes might be justifiable, the 
intricacies of which were reflected in the findings of an international 
commission on the issue which found that NATO’s actions were 
‘illegal but legitimate’.4
At issue was the relationship between the state and its own population, 
the credibility of the international community’s commitment to very 
basic standards of human rights and the role of the UN in the twenty-
first century. The dilemmas were set out succinctly by Kofi Annan in 
his 1999 Address to the General Assembly:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international 
order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council 
mandate, one might ask…in the context of Rwanda: If, in those 
dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of 
States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, 
but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a 
coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when 
States and groups of States can take military action outside 
the established mechanisms for enforcing international law, 
one might ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions 
undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created 
after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents 
for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who 
might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances?5
It was in part to find answers to these questions that Canada decided 
to establish an International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohammed 
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Sahnoun, in 2000. The commission’s report, entitled Responsibility 
to Protect, was released in December 2001 and endorsed by Annan, 
who described it as ‘the most comprehensive and carefully thought-
out response we have seen to date’.6 The ICISS argued that states 
had a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, mass 
killing and ethnic cleansing and that when states proved either 
unwilling or unable to fulfil this duty, residual responsibility was 
transferred to the international community. From this perspective, 
RtoP comprised three interrelated sets of responsibilities: to prevent, 
react and rebuild.7 The Commission identified proposals designed 
to strengthen the international community’s effectiveness in each of 
these areas, including a prevention toolkit, decision-making criteria 
for the use of force, and a hierarchy of international authority in 
situations where the Security Council was divided.   
RtoP would not have enjoyed such a rapid rise without the 
endorsement of Kofi Annan and his decision, taken in the wake of the 
oil-for-food scandal, to summon a world summit to consider proposals 
for UN reform. In preparation for summit, Annan commissioned 
a High Level Panel to examine the challenges confronting the 
organization and make recommendations as to how it might meet 
them. In its final report, the Panel (which included Gareth Evans) 
endorsed ‘the emerging norm that there is a responsibility to protect’, 
supported the ICISS proposal for criteria to guide decisions about 
the use of force, and called for the permanent members of the 
Security Council to exercise restraint in their use of veto in situations 
involving large-scale violence against civilians.8 Annan adopted most 
of these recommendations in his own blueprint for reform, In Larger 
Freedom.9 This put RtoP squarely on the international agenda at the 
2005 World Summit.
In summary, RtoP emerged out of the failure to protect populations 
from genocide and mass atrocities in the 1990s. Developments in a 
range of fields – including peacekeeping, refugee and displacement 
work, humanitarian relief, international diplomacy, and regional 
action – in response to these failures focused international attention 
on the protection of human life in situations of conscience-shocking 
inhumanity. The crises in Rwanda and Kosovo exposed critical 
challenges relating to the political will to act (Rwanda) and the 
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authority on which action may be taken (Kosovo). The ICISS was 
established in response to these challenges and its report coined the 
phrase ‘responsibility to protect’, developing earlier ideas about the 
state’s primary responsibility to protect its own population and the 
role of the international community when it fails to do so.      
2005 World Summit Agreement
RtoP was unanimously endorsed by the 2005 World Summit, 
the largest ever gathering of Heads of State and Government. 
The Summit’s outcome document was later adopted as a General 
Assembly resolution. Paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit’s 
Outcome Document declared that:
138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect 
its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility 
and will act in accordance with it. The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, 
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian andother peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to 
help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility 
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to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in 
mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We 
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, 
to helping States build capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the 
Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. 
This commitment to RtoP has been reaffirmed several times by 
the UN Security Council, including in Resolutions 1674 (2006), 
1894 (2009) and 2150 (2014) and in 2009 the General Assembly 
committed itself to ongoing consideration of its implementation (A/
RES/63/308). It is important to distinguish between the RtoP that 
governments have agreed to adopt and the ideas that helped shape it, 
including the proposals of the ICISS, mentioned earlier. There are six 
key points to bear in mind in this regard.
First, RtoP is narrow in scope, but universal and enduring in its 
coverage. RtoP applies everywhere, all the time. In other words, all 
states have a permanent responsibility to protect their populations 
from the four crimes. As the UN Secretary-General pointed out in 
2012, the question is never one of whether or not RtoP ‘applies’ – 
because this wrongly implies that there are situations in which states 
do not have a responsibility to protect their populations – but of 
how best to realize its goals in any given situation.10 The principle is 
narrow, though, because it relates only to the four crimes identified 
in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to their 
prevention. RtoP does not relate directly to threats to human life 
stemming from natural disasters, diseases, armed conflict in general 
or non-democratic forms of government.11
Second, states have a responsibility to protect all populations under 
their care, not just citizens or civilians in times of armed conflict. 
Paragraphs 138-139 specifically refer to populations and not citizens 
or civilians in armed conflict.
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Third, RtoP is based on well-established principles of international 
law. The crimes to which it relates are enumerated in international 
law. In addition, states already have legal obligations to prevent and 
punish genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; assist 
states to fulfill their obligations under international humanitarian 
law; and promote compliance with the law. In addition, the World 
Summit Outcome Document is clear in stating that RtoP is to be 
implemented through the UN Charter. Nothing in the RtoP principle 
permits action outside the UN Charter. 
Fourth, the World Summit Outcome Document calls explicitly for 
the prevention of the four crimes and their incitement. As such, 
prevention is at the core of RtoP, with other measures contemplated 
only when prevention fails or (in line with Article 42 of the UN 
Charter) is thought likely to fail by the UN Security Council. 
Fifth, force may be used only when authorized by the UN Security 
Council and when other, peaceful, measures adopted under Chapters 
VI and VIII of the UN Charter are thought unlikely to succeed.
Sixth,  Member States declared their support for the mandate of 
the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide. This mandate, 
approved in 2004, includes tasks directly related to early warning 
and assessment: (a) to collect existing information, in particular 
from within the UN system, relating to violations of human rights 
that could give rise, if nothing were done, to genocide; (b) to bring 
situations of concern to the Secretary-General and, through him, to 
the Security Council; (c) to make recommendations to the Security 
Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or 
halt genocide; (d) to liaise with the UN system on activities for the 
prevention of genocide and to enhance the capacity of the UN system 
to analyze and manage relevant information.12
The UN Secretary-General’s Implementation Strategy
The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon has often spoken of his 
‘deep and enduring’ personal commitment to RtoP.13 In February 
2008, the UN announced the appointment of Edward Luck as the 
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Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the RtoP with responsibility 
for the further conceptual, political and institutional development 
of the concept. Luck adopted a careful and consultative approach 
based on a forensic understanding of the 2005 agreement and deep 
engagement with Member States. Key to this diplomatic effort was 
Luck’s insistence on distinguishing what states had actually agreed in 
2005 from the various other forms of RtoP circulating in academic and 
civil society circles.14 The result was the 2009 report of the Secretary-
General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, a landmark 
report that identified the three pillars of RtoP and which continues 
to guide thought and practice. The Secretary-General’s first report 
on RtoP clarified the meaning and scope of the concept and set out 
a comprehensive strategy for its implementation.  It maintained that 
RtoP ‘is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary’, that grows from the 
principle of sovereignty as responsibility rather than through the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.15 As such, it contended that 
RtoP was focused on helping states to succeed, not just on reacting 
when they fail. 
The Secretary-General set out a comprehensive strategy for imple-
menting RtoP, adopting a ‘narrow but deep’ approach: narrow in 
its exclusive focus on the prevention of four crimes (genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity) and protec-
tion of populations from them, but deep in its ambition to employ 
all instruments available to the UN system, regional and sub-regional 
arrangements, Member States, and civil society. This strategy was or-
ganized around the idea that RtoP rested on three pillars. These pil-
lars were non-sequential (one does not need to apply pillars one and 
two before moving to pillar three) and of equal importance, such that 
the whole edifice of RtoP would collapse if it were not supported by 
all three pillars.16
The first pillar refers to the primary responsibility of the state to 
protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.17 The 
Secretary-General described this pillar as the ‘bedrock’ of RtoP which 
derives from sovereign responsibility itself and the international legal 
obligations that states already had (para. 138).18  The Secretary-General 
recognized that although this commitment was unambiguous, the 
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question of how states might best exercise their RtoP was more 
difficult to answer.  As such, he called for more research on why some 
societies plunge into mass violence whilst others managed to escape 
this fate.19 He also proposed a variety of additional measures that 
states could take to fulfill their primary responsibility to protect. 
These included, first, encouraging peer-review of their performance 
in meeting their RtoP obligations through the Human Rights 
Council’s Universal Peer Review (UPR) mechanism.20 Second, 
ensuring that states are parties to the relevant instruments of human 
rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, as well 
as to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The Secretary-General argued that states should also incorporate this 
law into domestic jurisdiction and implement it faithfully.21 Third, 
states should assist the ICC and other international tribunals by, 
for example, locating and apprehending indictees.22 Fourth, RtoP 
principles should be localized into each culture and society so that 
they are owned and acted upon by communities.23 Fifth, states, even 
stable ones, should ensure that they have mechanisms in place to 
deal with bigotry, intolerance, racism and exclusion.24
These themes were further amplified by the Secretary-General 
in his 2013 report on RtoP, which focused on the state’s primary 
responsibility to protect.25 In this report, the Secretary-General 
further underscored the primacy of the state’s responsibility to protect 
its own populations and identified some of the factors found within 
states and societies that give rise to genocide and mass atrocities. In 
an attempt to offer concrete advice to states about what they ought 
to do to fulfill their commitment to RtoP, the Secretary-General 
offered seven core recommendations. States should, he argued:
·	 Appoint a senior-level focal point with atrocity prevention 
responsibilities;
·	 Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience;
·	 Sign, ratify and implement relevant international legal 
instruments;
·	 Engage with and support other Member States and regional 
or subregional arrangements to share experiences and enhance 
cooperation to promote the effective use of resources;
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·	 Participate in peer review processes, including the universal 
periodic review of the Human Rights Council.
·	 Identify and form partnerships with other Member States, 
regional and subregional arrangements or civil society for 
technical assistance and capacity building;
·	 Participate in international, regional and national discussions on 
the further advancement of the responsibility to protect and its 
implementation.26
Whilst some of these recommendations (appoint a focal point, sign 
and ratify relevant treaties, conduct an assessment) were clear and 
specific, others were less so (identify and form partnerships). And, 
whilst the Secretary-General signaled a clear intention to evaluate 
the extent to which Member States were actually implementing these 
recommendations, there was relatively little follow-up and no formal 
process engaging member states in dialogue on implementation 
beyond the annual informal debate of the General Assembly.
The second pillar refers to the international community’s responsibility 
to assist and encourage states to fulfill their responsibility to protect, 
particularly by helping them to address the underlying causes of 
genocide and mass atrocities, build the capacity to prevent these 
crimes, address problems before they escalate, and encouraging them 
to fulfill their commitments. (paras. 138 and 139).27
In 2009, the Secretary-General identified four specific aspects of this 
Pillar II responsibility.28  First, encouraging states to meet their pillar 
one responsibilities (para. 138) so that those inciting or planning to 
commit the four crimes need to be made aware that they will be held 
to account.29 The Secretary-General also suggested that this include 
incentives to encourage parties towards reconciliation.30 Second, 
helping states to exercise their responsibility, especially by supporting 
security sector reform aimed at building and sustaining legitimate 
and effective security forces makes an important contribution to 
maintaining stability and provides states with the capacity to respond 
quickly and legitimately to emerging problems.31 Third, helping 
states build their capacity to protect through targeted economic 
development assistance, which would assist in preventing the four 
crimes by reducing inequalities, improving education, giving the 
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poor a stronger voice, and increasing political participation.32 He 
maintained that international assistance should help states and 
societies to build the specific capacities they need prevent genocide 
and mass atrocities.33The third element of Pillar II was the provision 
of assistance to states ‘under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out’. He suggested that the UN and regional arrangements could build 
rapidly deployable civilian and police capacities to help countries 
under stress and noted that where relevant crimes were committed 
by non-state actors, international military assistance to the state may 
be an effective form of assistance.34
Many of these ideas were developed further in the Secretary-
General’s 2014 report on RtoP, which focused specifically on pillar II 
and the question of international assistance.35 As with his treatment 
of the first pillar, the Secretary-General’s follow-up on international 
assistance included some concrete recommendations for action 
by Member States, though these were somewhat vaguely worded, 
leading some states to ask, privately, what it was, specifically that the 
Secretary-General wanted them to do. The Secretary-General asked 
that states:
·	 Leverage existing mechanisms and institutions to encourage 
States to fulfil their responsibility to protect;
·	 Invest in tools to encourage States to fulfil their responsibility to 
protect;
·	 Improve existing forms of national, regional and international 
assistance by incorporating atrocity crime risks and dynamics 
into conflict analysis;
·	 Focus existing capacity-building efforts on eliminating horizontal 
inequalities and design or strengthen capacity-building 
programmes aimed at the seven inhibitors of atrocity crimes;
·	 Enhance the availability and expertise of specialized civilian 
resources;
·	  Ensure that international assistance under pillar II is coordinated 
and coherent.36
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Undoubtedly the most difficult and controversial of RtoP’s three 
pillars, Pillar III refers to the international community’s responsibility 
to take timely and decisive action to protect populations from the 
four crimes through diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means (principally in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
UN Charter) and, on a case-by-case basis, should peaceful means 
‘prove inadequate’ and national authorities are manifestly failing 
to protect their populations, other more forceful means through 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (para. 139).37 The wording agreed by 
states in 2005 suggests that Pillar III comprises two steps. The first, 
set out in the opening sentence of paragraph 139 (‘the international 
community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to 
help protect populations’ from the four crimes), involves an on-going 
responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means to protect populations. The paragraph’s second sentence sets 
out a wider range of measures that may be used if two conditions are 
satisfied: (1) ‘should peaceful means be inadequate’ (in other words, 
judged inadequate by the Security Council in line with Article 42 of 
the Charter) and (2) ‘national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations’. In these situations, it may be appropriate 
to take timely and decisive action through the Security Council, 
including enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.38 
The Secretary-General noted that military intervention was just 
one of the measures that might be used, a theme he returned to in 
2012 in arguing that effective use of non-coercive measures was an 
important aspect of pillar III which would reduce the need for the 
use of force.39
In the context of Pillar III, the Secretary-General suggested that 
permanent members of the Security Council should refrain from 
using their veto in situations of manifest failure and should act in good 
faith to reach a consensus in such cases.40 He also stressed that the UN 
should strengthen its capacity for the rapid deployment of military 
personnel.41  Finally, he suggested that the UN should strengthen its 
partnerships with regional and sub-regional arrangements to facilitate 
rapid cooperation.42
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The ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings and the post-election crisis in Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2010-2011 propelled  RtoP to the forefront of international 
attention and placed the focus squarely on the principle’s controversial 
third pillar. RtoP was explicitly used by the Security Council in its 
resolutions on Libya (Res. 1970 (2011); Res. 1973 (2011), which first 
imposed a raft of targeted sanctions and embargoes and referred 
the situation to the ICC and then authorized the use of force to 
protect civilians and police a no-fly zone. The implementation of 
these resolutions by NATO and its partners, and the role of UNOCI 
peacekeepers in the violent resolution of the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, 
brought fresh urgency to questions about the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions and the emergence of a new concept – 
‘responsibility whilst protecting’ – which was proposed by Brazil (see 
below). 
In this context, the fourth report of the Secretary-General, issued 
in 2012, focused on the third pillar of RtoP. This report: (1) clarified 
the relationship between the three pillars, reiterating their mutual 
interdependence such that efforts under the first two pillars should 
reduce the need to exercise the third; (2) identified the tools available 
to the UN for timely and decisive response, demonstrating that 
there is much more to Pillar III than the use of force and that, as a 
general rule, the more coercive the measure is, the less likely it is to 
be employed; (3) identified the key partners in protection, noting 
the role played by humanitarian action, peacekeeping, regional 
arrangements and civil society; and (4) considered the concept of 
‘responsibility while protecting’.43
These reports, and the Secretary-General’s strategy overall, were 
generally well received by the UN’s member states. The General 
Assembly’s first interactive dialogue on RtoP broadly vindicated the 
Secretary-General’s strategy.44 Ninety-four speakers, representing some 
180 governments (including the Non-Aligned Movement) from every 
region participated.45  Of those, only four (Cuba, Venezuela, Sudan 
and Nicaragua) called for renegotiation of the 2005 agreement. The 
others typically agreed with the Secretary-General’s interpretation of 
RtoP’s meaning and scope and welcomed his report.46 The challenge, 
Member States agreed, was to implement RtoP, not re-negotiate it. 
Within this context, participating Asian, Latin American and sub-
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Saharan African states were eager to stress six key points, which ought 
to be understood as bedrocks of the global consensus on RtoP. First, 
that RtoP is a universal principle that should be implemented equally 
and fairly in a non-selective fashion (early warning and assessment 
should be non-selective and non-political).47 Second, that the 
responsibility to protect lies first and foremost with the state.48 Third, 
that RtoP applies only to the four crimes (genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity) and their prevention. 
Fourth, the principle must be implemented and exercised in a manner 
consistent with international law, especially the UN Charter.49 Fifth, 
timely and decisive response (Pillar III) encompasses more than just 
coercion or the use of force. Sixth, prevention is the most important 
element of RtoP.50 The General Assembly passed a resolution 
which acknowledged the Secretary-General’s report, noted that the 
Assembly had engaged in a productive debate, and committed the 
Assembly to continuing its consideration of the matter.51 Subsequent 
reports and debates focused on individual aspects of the Secretary-
General’s agenda for implementation, especially early warning and 
assessment (2010), regional arrangements (2011), timely and decisive 
response (2012), the state’s primary responsibility to protect (2013), 
and international assistance (2014). 
The General Assembly’s subsequent informal interactive dialogue 
provided further support for the concept of RtoP and the UN 
Secretary-General’s strategy for implementation. Despite the highly 
controversial nature of the subject, Member States largely agreed with 
the Secretary-General’s assessment that RtoP was a concept ‘whose 
time has come’, his view that nobody now doubts that states do 
indeed have a responsibility to protect, and belief that international 
debates have shifted from the question of ‘whether’ to implement 
RtoP to that of ‘how’ to. Member States also accepted the Secretary-
General’s view that that RtoP applies everywhere and all the time. 
Of these, the Assembly’s 2012 dialogue – coming in the wake of the 
controversial intervention in Libya – was perhaps the most crucial 
test of the Secretary-General’s implementation plan. Fifty-eight 
states, one regional arrangement and two civil society organizations 
participated in the dialogue. Despite controversies about the use 
of force, accountability, and concerns about the potential misuse 
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of RtoP to justify ‘regime change’, no Member State called for the 
renegotiation of RtoP. Indeed, one of the Member States most critical 
of the use of force in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, South Africa, 
insisted that there could be ‘no going back’ on what was agreed in 
2005. Member States as diverse as Sri Lanka, Iran and Viet Nam 
voiced their acceptance of RtoP. With almost complete unanimity, 
States welcomed the Secretary-General’s report and endorsed his 
view that whilst the third pillar of RtoP included much more than just 
the use of force or other coercive measures, enforcement measures 
– including military enforcement – remained an important aspect 
of the RtoP toolkit, to be used as a last resort. One issue that did 
emerge, however, was directly pertinent to the Secretary-General’s 
three pillars. That was the question of sequencing, to which I now 
turn.  
Three Pillars: To Sequence or Not to Sequence
One of the most significant debates relating to the three pillars of RtoP 
relates to the relationship between them in particular the question of 
sequencing. As I noted earlier, in his 2009 report on implementing 
RtoP, the Secretary-General maintained that the three pillars were 
non-sequential and of equal importance – a view that was welcomed 
by Member States at the time. However, in response to what it, and 
others, saw as problems with the interpretation and implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya, Brazil issued 
a concept paper on ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ later that year.52 
Among other things, the paper called for the chronological sequencing 
of RtoP’s three pillars. Chronological sequencing is the idea that 
the international community must work sequentially through the 
three pillars, testing every available peaceful tool and only resorting 
to coercion or force when these other measures have failed. A 
majority of participating states that referred to sequencing in the 
General Assembly’s 2012 dialogue rejected the idea of chronological 
sequencing, arguing instead that the international community’s 
response to genocide and mass atrocities should be appropriately 
tailored to each situation. Brazil itself offered an alternative, non-
chronological, account of sequencing at the 2012 dialogue. It argued 
that sequencing between the pillars should be ‘logical, based on 
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political prudence. It does not mean the establishment of arbitrary 
checklists’. In other words, ‘timely and decisive responses’ should 
aim to achieve the greatest degree of protection with the minimal 
degree of forceful interference but priority should be given to doing 
what works in order to protect populations from the four RtoP crimes 
and tailoring international responses to each individual situation. 
This approach to sequencing would be entirely in keeping with the 
Secretary-General’s recommendations in his 2012 report on RtoP.
However, although Brazil altered its stance on sequencing, a 
small number of Member States continued to stress the need for 
chronological sequencing. Because of this, and because chronological 
sequencing raises conceptual, legal and institutional, and practical 
questions about this core element of RtoP, it is worth examining in 
more depth.
Conceptually, the three pillars of RtoP are so intertwined as to make 
sequencing impossible in practice. States are supported in their 
efforts to fulfill the first pillar by both pillar two and those elements 
of the third pillar which relate to assisting ‘states under stress’ before 
they reach the point of ‘manifest failure’. It makes little sense to 
deny the obvious overlaps between the two injunctions. Equally, it 
makes little sense to argue that international society should withhold 
support from states (pillar two) until they face difficulty achieving 
their first pillar responsibilities. Nor does it make any sense to argue 
that pillar two activities should cease when ‘timely and decisive 
response’ is needed or that international society’s first response to 
state-based mass killing should be to furnish the perpetrators with 
assistance (pillar II). There would be obvious moral objections to a 
concept of RtoP which demanded that the world’s first response to 
the Rwandan genocide should have been to ‘assist’ the regime that 
was largely responsible.
Moreover, it is far from clear where the specific injunctions to prevent 
the four crimes and their incitement found in paragraph 138 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document would fit into the chronological 
sequencing schema. Taken literally, sequencing in this context 
would require either that diplomacy and other peaceful means 
not be used for preventive purposes because they were also part of 
‘timely and decisive responses’ or that the response component of 
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RtoP be stripped back to its most coercive aspects. Neither solution 
is appealing; neither is in keeping with what states agreed in 2005. 
In short, taken literally chronological sequencing would give rise to 
a situation where international society could take preventive action 
only after national authorities had failed to protect their populations 
from the four crimes. At that point, of course, ‘timely and decisive 
responses’ would be required too.
Turning to the institutional problems, ‘chronological’ sequencing 
is inconsistent with both the UN Charter and paragraph 139 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document. Not only does neither document 
demand chronological sequencing, each counsels against it. Article 
42 of the Charter states that: ‘Should the Security Council consider 
that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security...’. This wording clearly permits the Council flexibility 
to adopt coercive measures without first using peaceful measures in 
situations where it judges that such measures (‘provided for in Article 
41’) ‘would be inadequate’. The proceedings of the UN’s founding 
conference confirm that this was the intent behind the wording, 
which was suggested by Canada, and that this was indeed how the 
article was understood at the time. Its meaning was well articulated 
by US Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, at the time:
It should be pointed out that the sequence of Articles 41 and 
42 does not mean that the Council must in all cases resort to 
non-military measures in the first instance. While ordinarily 
this would be the case, since crises generally take a long time 
to develop, in a case of sudden aggression the Security Council 
may resort at once to military action without proceeding through 
any intermediate step, and the language of Article 42 has been 
refined to make this clear.53
This rationale applies equally to all situations in which the Council 
might consider employing measures under Article 42, including in 
relation to RtoP’s third pillar. Thus, whilst it might be expected that in 
most cases the Council would respond to genocide or mass atrocities 
first with peaceful measures, there may be situations where these 
crimes begin very suddenly and sharply or where peaceful measures 
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are judged unlikely to succeed from the outset. In those situations, 
the Charter expressly permits the Council to employ Article 42 
measures without having first adopted measures under Article 41.
In relation to the broader argument that the Council should make 
recourse to RtoP’s third pillar only when member states have 
exhausted the first two pillars, it should be recalled that Article 39 
of the Charter grants the Council an exclusive right to determine 
‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ 
and what steps should be taken to restore international peace and 
security. Article 25 binds the wider membership to accepting the 
Council’s decisions in this regard. This is not the place to discuss 
the merits or demerits of the UN Charter. It need only be said here 
that the idea of chronological sequencing in relation to RtoP’s three 
pillars is inconsistent with the Charter and could not be advanced 
without either revising the Charter itself or persuading the Council 
to act in ways contrary to the Charter’s prescriptions. 
Chronological sequencing is also inconsistent with what was agreed 
in 2005. The first sentence of paragraph 139, cited earlier, speaks of a 
general international responsibility, held by the United Nations as a 
whole, to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to 
protect populations from the four crimes and violations. The strong 
presumption here is that these activities are ongoing, regular and not 
confined to the Security Council. ‘In this context’ of international 
efforts to protect populations from the four crimes there may be times 
when collective action is required through the Security Council. The 
paragraph’s second sentence holds that when peaceful measures are 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations, the Security Council should take timely and 
decisive action in accordance with the Charter including through 
Chapter VII.
Four points are of critical importance to understand why these two 
sentences are not chronologically sequenced. First, and most obviously, 
nothing in either sentence implies that the Security Council may act 
in relation to the second sentence only once international society 
has literally exhausted the first. Second, the first sentence refers 
to activities undertaken by the UN as a whole, not by the Security 
Council alone. As such, the second sentence, which refers to action by 
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the Council, cannot logically be said to follow the first chronologically 
because the two sentences relate to different entities and organs. 
From the Council’s perspective, the first sentence refers only to the 
general ‘context’ of responsibility in which it acts. Third, read in the 
context of the UN Charter, it is clear that it is for the Council itself to 
determine whether peaceful means are inadequate and the national 
authorities ‘manifestly failing’ in their RtoP. The only conditions 
placed upon the exercise of this judgment are that decisions be made 
on a ‘case- by-case basis’ and in cooperation with relevant regional 
arrangements where appropriate. Even here, though, it is left to the 
Council to make determinations on both these points. No authority 
is granted to any other body in this regard nor any restrictions placed 
on the Council’s judgments. There is no requirement in the text 
that the Council work through peaceful measures before resorting 
to enforcement. Fourth, in using the word ‘inadequate’, paragraph 
139 uses the same adjective employed by Article 42 of the Charter 
and does not require that peaceful measures must have ‘proved to be 
inadequate’ which it surely would have done had the intention been 
to require formal sequencing.
A third problem with chronological sequencing is practical. Sometimes, 
there is simply no time to allow diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means to have a restraining effect because the timeframe 
between the emergence of a risk of genocide and mass atrocities 
and its actualization is very short or because the intensity in which 
the crimes and violations are committed is so severe. Other times, 
peaceful measures are patently unsuitable. In these types of context, 
chronological sequencing would require delayed and indecisive 
responses – precisely the opposite of what Member States called for 
in paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document – and 
cost untold lives. Moreover, the longer that situations are allowed to 
persist, the more complicated and expensive decisive responses are 
likely to become. In the dark days of the Rwandan genocide, had the 
Security Council found the will to act decisively it would have made 
no sense to demand that it run through its (extensive) repertoire of 
peaceful measures before authorizing the use of force. Had it done so, 
the outcome would have been little different to the actual historical 
result in terms of the number of lives lost. 
Alex J. Bellamy
57
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
The picture is further complicated by the irresolvable question of 
how much time peaceful measures should be given to satisfy the 
demands of chronological sequencing. At the 2012 dialogue, India 
argued that ‘sufficient time should be allowed to see that the non-
coercive measures employed are bringing the desired results’. But 
what is ‘sufficient time’ and how can it be known in advance? Hutu 
genocidaires in Rwanda took only 100 days to slaughter 800,000 
people.  It took the Khmer Rouge a little under three years to cause 
the deaths of a quarter of Cambodia’s whole population. The 
perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities are often highly skilled 
at forestalling timely and decisive international action. Even when 
conditions are ‘ripe’, mediation can take months, if not years, to bear 
fruit, as can other non- forcible measures. Conditions are rarely ‘ripe’ 
when one party believes it can prevail by perpetrating genocide and 
other mass atrocities. If chronological sequencing were accepted, at 
what point would it be agreed that peaceful measures had failed? 
In all likelihood, the cost of surety would be paid for by the loss of 
thousands of innocent lives.
Many states argued have argued that the use of force for RtoP 
purposes should always be a ‘last resort’. Indeed, this is a point 
repeatedly emphasized by the Secretary-General. It is important 
to clarify what ‘last resort’ means. According to the moral tradition 
from which it arose (the Christian, ‘Just War’, tradition) ‘last resort’ 
refers to the idea that force or other coercive measures may be used 
only when they are judged to be the only, or the most proportionate, 
means of righting a sufficiently grave wrong (one that constitutes a 
‘just cause’ in the language of the Just War tradition). Last resort does 
not require literally the exhaustion of every means short of force. If it 
did, the use of force would never be justified because there are always 
alternatives – including accepting the fait accompli of genocide. 
Instead, last resort demands that decision-makers carefully evaluate 
all the different strategies that might bring about the desired ends, 
selecting force only if it appears to provide the only feasible, or the 
most proportionate, way of securing those ends.
Does a rejection of ‘chronological’ sequencing diminish the relative 
importance of the first two pillars of RtoP by pushing the concept 
inexorably towards its most coercive aspects? Pakistan raised this 
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concern explicitly in the General Assembly and Singapore argued 
that the first two pillars were mere ‘window dressing’ for the third. 
There are at least two reasons for thinking that the non-sequential 
account of the three pillars, articulated by the UN Secretary-General 
in 2009, does not give undue weight to the coercive elements of RtoP. 
First, the state’s primary responsibility to protect its population from 
the four crimes and violations is an enduring legal obligation that 
predates the emergence of RtoP. Pillar one is the day-to-day business 
of government through which most of the world’s states protect their 
own populations as a matter of routine. Likewise, RtoP’s second 
pillar – assistance to help states fulfill their primary responsibility to 
protect – ought to be part of the fabric of international relations, a 
core and habitual practice that is normal business for the UN and 
its partners. Whilst much of the UN’s work contributes to this goal, 
pillar two support is not yet a self-conscious or systematic part of 
the organization’s daily business. In 2012, Vietnam argued that this 
aspect of RtoP is ‘immensely important’. The direction of attention 
and resources to prevention should reduce the need for recourse to 
Article 42 of the Charter, but it does not follow that the use of this 
article undermines work on prevention. Indeed, as the Secretary-
General pointed out in his 2012 report, past history has taught us 
that the more coercive the tool, the less likely it is to be used. What is 
more, as mentioned earlier, determined action in relation to the first 
two pillars may make action under the third pillar unnecessary. 
Conclusion
Implementation of RtoP within the UN has therefore come a long way 
in a short space of time, though many significant challenges remain. 
Among the key achievements are the widening and deepening of the 
shared understanding of RtoP as agreed in paragraphs 138-140 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document and consensus on the principle. 
This includes consensus on the nature and scope of RtoP’s three 
pillars, notwithstanding debate about the nature of the relationship 
between them. As the UN Secretary-General has argued, no one 
now doubts that there is a responsibility to protect or disputes the 
concept’s meaning and scope.  The global debate on RtoP is moving 
past the question of the principle itself towards matters relating to its 
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implementation, but that does not mean that the concept does not 
confront innumerable challenges and controversies. It is one thing to 
agree on an abstract principle, it is another thing entirely to agree on 
how that principle should be interpreted and realized in specific cases 
and to persuade states to change important aspects of both domestic 
and foreign policy. 
NOTES
1. The story behind the Genocide Convention is conveyed by Power, 
Samantha (2002). A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Ge-
nocide, New York: Basic Books.
2. For example, O’Callaghan and Pantuliano (2007). Protective Action, 
Oxfam International, Beyond the Headlines: An Agenda for Action to 
Protect Civilians in Neglected Conflicts. Oxford: Oxfam GB for Oxfam 
International, 2003; OCHA, Special Report: Civilian Protection in 
Armed Conflict. New York: OCHA Integrated Regional Information 
Network, 2003. 
3. Kofi Annan (1999). ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 
18 September.
4. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
5. Kofi Annan (1999). ‘Annual Report to the UN General Assembly’, 20 
September.
6. Kofi Annan (2002). ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, address to the 
International Peace Academy, 15 February 2002, UN press release SG/
SM/8125.
7. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(2001). The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: IDRC.
8. UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, 
para. 203.  On the issue of veto restraint see Ariela Blatter and Paul 
The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
60
Williams, ‘The Responsibility not to Veto’, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 3 (2) 2011.
9. Kofi Annan (2005). ‘In larger Freedom: Towards Development, Secu-
rity and Human Rights for All’, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. 
10. Ban Ki-moon (2012). Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Re-
sponse, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/874-S/2012/578, 25 July.
11. Contrary to what some academics have claimed. See, for example, 
Robert Pape (2012). ‘When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of 
Humanitarian Intervention’, International Security, 37 (1).
12. S/2004/567, annex.
13. First set out in his landmark ‘Berlin speech’ in 2008. Ban Ki-moon, 
‘Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed 
World’, SG/SM/11701, 15 July 2008.
14. The point was emphasized in one of Luck’s first publications on RtoP 
after assuming the role of special adviser.  Edward C. Luck (2007). 
‘The Responsible Sovereign and the Responsibility to Protect’, An-
nual Review of United Nations Affairs, 2006/2007. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. xxxv.
15. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, para 10(a).
16. Ibid., para. 12.
17. World Summit Outcome Document, para 138.
18. Ibid.,para 11(a).
19. Ibid., paras. 15 and 22.
20. Ibid., para. 16.
21. Ibid., para. 17.
22. Ibid., para. 19.
23. Ibid., para. 20.
24. Ibid., para. 21.
25. Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention. Report 
of the Secretary-General, A/67/629-S/2013/399, 9 July 2013.
26. Ibid., para. 71.
Alex J. Bellamy
61
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
27. World Summit Outcome Document, para. 139.
28. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, para. 28
29. Ibid., para. 32.
30. Ibid., para. 32
31. Ibid., para. 46.
32. Ibid., para. 43.
33. Ibid., para. 44.
34. Ibid., para. 40.
35. Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the 
responsibility to protect. Report of the Secretary-General, A/68/947-
S/2014/449, 11 July 2014.
36. Ibid., para. 77.
37. A/60/L.1, 20 September 2005, paras. 138-140. See Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect.
38. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, para. 49.
39. Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response. Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/66/874-S/2012/578, 25 July 2012.
40. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, para. 61.
41. Ibid., para. 64.
42. Ibid., para. 65.
43. Ban Ki-moon (2012). Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response, A/66/874-S/2012/578, 25 July 2012.
44. See Office of the President of the General Assembly, ‘Concept Note 
on Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, 
Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity’, undated (July 2009); 
ICR2P, ‘Report on the General Assembly Plenary Debate’, p. 3; and 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An 
Assessment’, August 2009, p. 3.
45. Including 51 statements from sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Latin 
America and the Carribbean.  Global Centre, ‘Implementing’, p 1.
The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
62
46. The statement of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is particularly 
instructive here.  See Statement by Maged A. Abdelaziz, Permanent 
Representative of Egypt, on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on 
Agenda Item 44 and 107: ‘Integrated and coordinated implementa-
tion of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations 
conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields; 
follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit: report of the 
Secretary-General’, New York, 23 July 2009.   According to the Global 
Centre, 40 states explicitly welcomed the Secretary-General’s report 
and over 50 endorsed his interpretation of RtoP as involving three 
pillars.  Global Centre, ‘Implementing’, p. 2. The NAM conveyed ‘its 
appreciation’ to the Secretary-General for his report.
47. See Statement of Hilario G. Davide Jr., Permanent Representation of 
the Philippines to the United Nations to the Thematic Debate on the 
Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect (A/63/677), New York, 23 July 2009 and Statement by Jim 
McLay, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United 
Nations to the United Nations, 17 July 2009.
48. E.g. see statement by Leslie K. Christian, Ambassador and Permanent 
Representative of Ghana to the United Nations on Agenda Items 44 
and 107: ‘Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up 
to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits 
in the economic, social and related fields; follow-up to the outcome 
of the Millennium Summit: report of the Secretary-General’, 23 July 
2009 and Statement by Claudia Blum, Permanent Representative of 
Colombia to the United Nations, 23 July 2009. 
49. Statement by Maged A. Abdelaziz, Permanent Representative of 
Egypt, on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on Agenda Items 44 
and 107: ‘Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-
up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and 
summits in the economic, social and related fields; follow-up to the 
outcome of the Millennium Summit: report of the Secretary-General’, 
New York, 23 July 2009. 
50. See Global Centre, ‘Implementing’, p. 6.
51. A/RES/63/308, 7 October 2009.
52. Responsibility while Protecting: elements for the development and pro-
motion of a concept, concept note written by the Foreign Ministry of 
Brazil, 9 November 2011.
Alex J. Bellamy
63
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
53. Cited by Edward C. Luck (2006). The UN Security Council. London: 
Routledge, note 13, p. 136. This is a generally accepted interpre-
tation of Article 42, and I know of no objections to this view. Also 
see Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik 
Zaum (2008). ‘Introduction’ in The United Nations Security Council 
and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 7.
REFERENCES
Annan, Kofi (1999). ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 18 
September 1999.
Annan, Kofi (1999). ‘Annual Report to the UN General Assembly’, 20 
September 1999.
Annan, Kofi (2002). ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, address to the In-
ternational Peace Academy, 15 February 2002, UN press release SG/
SM/8125.
Annan, Kofi (2005). ‘In larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All’, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.
Blatter,  Ariela and Paul Williams (2011).‘The Responsibility not to Veto’, 
Global Responsibility to Protect, 3 (2) 2011.
Cohen, Roberta and Francis M. Deng (1998).  Masses in Flight: The Glo-
bal Crisis of Internal Displacement, Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
Deng, Francis; Sadikiel Kamaro; Terrence Lyons; Don Rothchild and I. 
William Zartman (1996). Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Ma-
nagement in Africa, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Holt, Victoria and Tobias C. Berkman (2006). The Impossible Mandate? 
Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace 
Operations, Washington, DC: Stimson Centre.
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000). The Kosovo 
Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
64
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). 
The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: IDRC.
Ki-moon, Ban (2012). Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Respon-
se, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/874-S/2012/578, 25 July 2012.
Lowe, Vaughan; Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, 
(2008). ‘Introduction’ in The United Nations Security Council and 
War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Luck,  Edward C. (2006). The UN Security Council, London: Routledge. 
Luck, Edward C. (2007). ‘The Responsible Sovereign and the Responsibi-
lity to Protect’, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 2006/2007, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacFarlane, Neil and Yuen Foong (2006). Human Security and the UN, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
O’ Callaghan, S. and Pantuliano, S. (2007). Protective action: Incorporating 
civilian protection into humanitarian response. Humanitarian Policy 
Group, Overseas Development Institute.
OCHA (2003). Special Report: Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, New 
York: OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network.
Oxfam International (2003). Beyond the Headlines: An Agenda for Action 
to Protect Civilians in Neglected Conflicts, Oxford: Oxfam GB for 
Oxfam International.
Pape, Robert (2012). ‘When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Huma-
nitarian Intervention’, International Security, 37 (1), 2012.
Pape, Robert (2012). ‘When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Huma-
nitarian Intervention’, International Security, 37 (1), 2012.
Power, Samantha (2002). A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide, New York: Basic Books.
Terry, Fiona (2002). Condemned to Repeat? The Paradoxes of Humanitarian 
Aid, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
